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Problem XII

CHINA IN THE POST-WAR WORLD
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INTRODUCTION

f'

China's problems in the post-war era will be an intricate
blend of old and new. When the Sino-Japanese War commenced in 1937, China was in a period of transition which
demanded a fundamental re-examination of many phases of
her national life. Many old problems, inherent in China's
evolution, have remained unresolved under the stress of long
years of war. They will inevitably reappear in the post-war
period and merge with new issues now taking shape.
Insight into the questions involved in China's development
will constitute an important challenge to the United States in
the years following the war. People in this country are sadly
lacking at present in a realistic picture of the Chinese nation.
Formerly the tendency was to expect too little of China ; now,
the tendency is to expect too much. In the past, we often
spoke of China as a "weak" and " backward" country and
compared her to the states of mediaeval Europe. Today,
swinging the pendulum in the opposite direction, we cling to
an idealized conception which, through no fault of the Chinese,
is likely to "let us down" in the course of events.
The influence of the United States in the international
community cannot fail to be great in the post-war period.
During and after the peace settlement, many decisions will have
to be made, and our policies- for better or worse- will have
a far-reaching effect on China's future . Conversely, China
has assumed a new position in the Pacific area, a fact which
will be felt in many ways in the United States. Even aside
from other considerations, China's growing power for preserving peace in the Far East and the increased economic importance likely to result from her progressive industrialization,
are developments which are bound to affect our own interests.
1

Th is . An alysis has been prepared by Dorothy Rorg, R esearch A ssociate of the
Am erican Cou nci1, I nstitute of P acific Relations, who is responsible for any opinions

expressed .

BACKGROUND
The basic problems evident in China before the war fell
into two categories: those related to foreign affairs and those
arising out of internal conditions. For many countries the
cleavage between these two divisions is marked, but China's
domestic situation has been dominated to an unusual extent
by her relations with foreign Powers. Her history in recent
decades is very largely the history of a country trying to
extricate itself from outside control.
Through treaties made in the nineteenth century, foreigners
achieved special privileges in China which cut deeply into
her national life. Foreign governments obtained control of
Chinese tariffs which they fixed at approximately 5%. Foreign
citizens resident in China were given rights of extraterritoriality whereby they were tried in law courts conducted by their
own nationals and subject to the laws of their home countries.
Parts of certain Chinese cities were set aside as so-called Concessions or Settlements, where foreigners lived under their own
Administrations. Foreign gunboats moved in Chinese waters
and foreign troops were stationed on Chinese soil. With the
exception of the holding of Concessions, the United States
shared in these arrangements.
As conditions within China changed, especially during the
twentieth century, the Chinese became more and more hostile
to the special position enjoyed by foreigners in their country.
They not only resented the concrete privileges granted by the
treaties but came to regard the treaties per se as symbols of
what they believed to be the arrogant attitude displayed by
many Westerners toward the Chinese. The foreign communities in China were themselves divided on this issue and many
Americans and British accused their fellow-nationals of treating the Chinese without respect for their national needs or
their intrinsic dignity as individuals.
The resentment of the Chinese toward foreigners came to
a head in the summer of 1925 when an anti-foreign movement
swept the country, carrying in its wake demonstrations, riots
and boycotts. This anti-foreign trend was strengthened by the
growth of the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party.
Revitalized in 1924 under Dr. Sun Yat-sen with the help of
Russian advisers, the Kuomintang organized and conducted
a revolution. The Kuomintang split, but the revolution,
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nevertheless, engulfed all China and finally resulted in the
establishment in 1928 of the National Government under
Chiang Kai-shek.
From 1925 on, the Chinese Government, reenforced by
public opinion, insisted upon and obtained a gradual retreat
of the Powers from their treaty position. The United States,
which after the Washington Conference was eager to maintain
the leadership in a progressive policy toward China, showed a
willingness to meet the Chinese demands for treaty revision at
least half way. In 1928, it led a movement which resulted
finally in the return of tariff autonomy to China. At the
same time the United States and Great Britain started negotiations for the abolition of extraterritorial privileges, negotiations which might have reached a successful conclusion
if they had not been interrupted by the Manchurian Crisis in
1931. Following this, little was done until 1943, when both
the United States and Great Britain signed treaties with China
which virtually wiped out the special privileges held by their
citizens up to this time.
Alongside of the struggle for a revision of the treaties, the
Chinese had many other causes for disputes with foreigners.
One need only recall the wars fought with and over China, the
battle for concessions, the scramble for spheres of influence,
to realize that China has been one of the great passive battlegrounds over which the Powers have tried to outmaneuver each
other. Insight into these phases of China's relations with other
nations is essential not only to an understanding of history
but also to an understanding of post-war China. Chinese
resentment against foreigners was justified in the past and it
cannot be dissipated overnight. At the peace table and in
the post-war years, China may be moved, perhaps unconsciously, to seek some compensation for all she has undergone.
Indicative of this attitude are the remarks of T. S. Chien :2
"She will insist on meticulous equality of treatment in her
dealings with other nations. She will be jealously watchful
of her full sovereignty and freedom of action. The older
nations may be ready to accept a degree of international government and restricted sovereignty; the new Chinese nation
may behave chauvinistically."
To this he adds that China "will come to the peace table
young and perhaps with a chip on her shoulder."
• "New Chin a's D emands."

F oreign Affairs, July 1948, p. 690·8.
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In their attitude toward China's conduct of her foreign
relations in the post-war years, Americans should therefore
have in mind the direct bearing of the past on the present. In
addition, they should have a realistic picture of the situation
now existing within China. Although it is obviously impossible to review here all the elements that make up modern
China, there are some basic considerations that may serve as
guides to the future.
China is essentially an agricultural country and her problems
are primarily agricultural problems. At least three-quarters
of her population is agricultural and her peasants are staggering under an appalling burden of poverty; testimony to this
lies on every hand.
Small and scattered land holdings, rents, taxes, and credit
are among the peasant's most crucial problems. While lack
of data makes any accurate picture impossible, it appears that
in North China the averaae farm is no larger than two to eight
acres, while in the south it is only about one acre. According to one rough estimate, the landlords who form about 5%
of the population, own approximately half of the cultivated
land, while the peasants who constitute about 70% of the
population, own only 20o/o of the land. Moreover, individual
farms are so divided that one man's farm consists "of anything from 5 to 40 scattered squares, oblong , strips, wedaes
and corners of land, scattered over hedgeless fields and sometimes at a distance of more than a mile from each other."3
In addition to the pitiful smallness and fragmentation of
farms, the peasant has to face heavy burdens of rent and
taxes. Rents are estimated as taking commonly from SO%
to 60% of the harvest, and sometimes as much as 80%. Taxes
are heavy, consisting of land taxes, surtaxes and extra char~es
of varying kinds. Moreover, the system of tax collection
throws an unfair share of the burden on the peasant. The tax
collector is usually a local official who has obtained his job
through heredity and who uses all the techniques of "squeeze"
-so familiar in China-that he has learned from his forefathers. Unfortunately, these techniques are more easily
employed against the poor farmer than against his more pow~r
ful neighbor, the landlord, so that the latter is likely to escape
responsibility at the expense of the former.
As a result of these overwhelming difficulties, the peasant
a R. H . Tawney, Land and Labor in China, p. 89 ,
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is constantly in need of money. Rough estimates, made before
the war, indicate that the minimum annual sum needed to
support a peasant family in China was about Ch. $150 and it
is probable that a large portion of the population fell below
even this standard. Under these circumstances there is little
the farmer can do except borrow money. This he does-maybe
from his landlord who is often the local money lender-at
exorbitant rates of interest. R. H. Tawney states that "a
'good money-lender' described as a blessing to his village has
been known to charge only 25%; but such restraint is exceptional."4 Interest is said to range between 20% and 60%
and often goes much higher. The consequence is that a farmer
who has once fallen into debt is usually unable to meet his expenses and pay his commitments to the money lender and thus
is caught more and more in a vicious spiral of borrowing.
This (the agrarian issue) is China's number one problempast, present and future. A criticism frequently levelled
against the National Government is that it has done little to
ameliorate these conditions. Moreover, the war itself is said
to have made the situation even more acute. In pushing Free
China back into the western provinces, it has wiped out the
influence of the manufacturers, traders and others who had
been engaged in modern enterprise and were, in many respects,
progressive in outlook. These groups tended to counterbalance the power of the landlord class which, now, without their
restraining influence, is in an even better position than formerly to oppose agrarian reforms. What effect this will have
on post-war developments remains to be seen.
Industrially, China is often compared to Europe on the
eve of the Industrial Revolution. Work in cottages and workshops is the rule rather than the exception. Weaving, the
making of clothes and shoes, the fashioning of furniture, metal
work, wood work, and an infinite variety of other trades are
carried on in small workships by little bands of workers. Side
by side with this situation, there has grown up within the last
half century a more modernized industrial system, largely confined, however, to the treaty ports and developed very
largely under foreign control. Although, especially in the
years before the war, there was a rapid increase in industrial
activity, China industrially is still far from comparable to the
modernized countries of Europe or to the United States. In
• Op. cit., p. 62.
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pre-war days, while there were some large factories in Chinanotably in the textile trade-the average plant had no more
than 200 employees, and it was estimated that all-in-all there
were probably no more than two million factory workers
throughout the country.
When the National Government came into power, it was
well aware of the necessity of "modernizing" China, of building the blood and tissues of a modern state. The pace of
industrialization was accelerated. Much emphasis was placed
on the building of a transportation system, and within ten
years roadway suitable for motor traffic was increased from
15,000 to 100,000 kilometers. While less progress was made
in respect to railroads, several thousand miles of tracks were
laid. Nevertheless in 1935 China possessed only 9,737 miles
of railways as compared to 254,000 miles in the United States.
In addition to these and similar measures, work was also
undertaken by the National Government in such fields as public health and education. In education, China has given most
attention to her primary schools. The number of primary
school children was increased by several millions before the
war, and secondary schools were improved in quantity and
quality.
.
One of the difficulties, however, with industrialization, establishment of communications, and other pre-war developments
in China, was that they took place largely in the eastern
provinces. Therefore, when Free China was forced to retreat
to the hinterland as a result of the Japanese invasion, she was
faced with the necessity of opening up a largely undeveloped
West. Throughout the war, rapid strides have been made
in constructing highways, railroads, factories, etc., and the
interior of China presents a very different aspect today from
that offered before 193 7. While this transformation should not
be exaggerated, it nevertheless carries with it great potentialities for the future.
Out of China's background, therefore, emerge certain factors, such as her changing relations with foreign Powers, the
magnitude of her agrarian problem, the early stages of her industrialization, and modernization in certain other spheres of
national life, which mark the starting point from which China
must set out on her post-war journey. In these terms, and
only in these terms, is it possible to understand the issues
involved in the future of Sino-American relations.

7
ANALYSIS
1. What does China want from the peace settlement and
how jar are her views likely to coincide with those of the
United States?
No official statement has as yet been made, indicating the
nature of the peace terms China is likely to demand. Nevertheless, by gathering together views obtained from responsible
sources, it is possible to gain an idea of the attitude of the
Chinese toward the peace settlement as a whole and toward
some of the terms under consideration.

a. What is the general attitude toward Japan likely to be
in both China and the United Statess after the war?
China and the United States will be among the leading
nations to effect a peace settlement with Japan. The question, therefore, of the attitude these countries will adopt in
approaching the peace negotiations is one of major importance.
Some Chinese argue in favor of moderation, affirming that
while Japan should be stripped of the power to commit further
acts of aggression, she should not be transformed into a ruined,
bankrupt, and revengeful neighbor. There are indications,
however, of a tendency within China to emphasize Japan's
past record of aggression and to insist that the character of
the Japanese people makes it impossible to use generous
methods. This line of reasoning is followed, for example, by
S. R. Chow in his recent book, Winning the Peace in the
Pacific,:; an expression of an important Chinese point of view:
"A big stick counts with them (the Japanese) more than lofty
principles, good faith, and soft words. It is a mistake to
think that one could make the Japanese quiet, reasonable, or
peace-loving by treating them generously after the war."6
Dr. Chow's views seem to be paralleled in the United States.
The Denver National Opinion Research Center states that
American hostility to Japan is intense; that it exceeds the
bitterness felt toward Germany; and that it has increased
markedly since the outbreak of the war. There seems little
doubt that antagonism to Japan in this country is great and
is growing greater.
• Dr. Chow's book has been drawn on extensively in the preparation of
of the Ana lysis .
• p. 11.
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b. What Chinese proposals have been made in respect to
specific peace terms? To what extent should we be prepared
to meet these demands?
Some of the points noted below have already been analyzed
in Problem XI from the point of view of arguments offered
for and against their acceptance by the United States. The
following summary of Chinese proposals has been taken from
different sources, some official, some unofficial. It seems evident that the United States should not reach a final decision
concerning the terms of the peace settlement, without giving
the fullest consideration to the demands of the Chinese. The
extent to which Chinese interests are involved in the settlement can be seen from such facts as the following: ( 1) Many
of the issues in respect to a territorial settlement in the Pacific
relate to former Chinese territory. (2) The consequences of
militarism in Japan have been felt by China more than by any
other country. (3) Japanese disarmament is as vital an issue
to China, as German disarmament was to France after the
last World War. (4) Many suggestions in regard to reparations involve the transfer of property to China.
Because of China's stake in the peace settlement, it is suggested that some of the questions already discussed under
Problem XI be reviewed in the light of the following Chinese
recommendations, with a view to ascertaining to what extent
we are prepared to join with China in her demands.
(1) Territorial settlement.
The Cairo Declaration oi President Roosevelt, Generalissimo
Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill announced that Japan
would be "stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first
World War in 1914"; that all the territories "stolen" from
China "such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores"
would be restored to the Chinese; that Japan would "be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed"; that Korea should "in due course" become
free and independent."
'
This proposed territorial adjustment met the demands which
had previously been stated unofficially on many occasions
by the Chinese. The extent to which Chinese aspirations were
satisfied at Cairo is reflected in reports that Chungking was
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"jubilant" on receiving the news of the Declaration and hailed
the settlement as China's "political and diplomatic victory."
China, the United States, and Great Britain have thus
agreed on the territorial questions at issue between China
and Japan. The Chinese, however, repeatedly bring up the
problem of Hongkong as a matter to be settled between themselves and the British. They want an immediate return of
Hongkong "without strings attached". It is suggested that
the British may prefer to treat this question as part of an
over-all settlement in the Pacific area, dealing not only with
China but with all the countries bordering on the Pacific.
In this case the United States would be among those having
to reach a decision concerning the future of Hongkong. The
suggestion has been made by some Englishmen that Hongkong
might be used as a base for an international police force. The
Chinese, however, emphasize the vital importance of Hongkong to their own country as a great commercial center for
South China. Compromise plans have been put forward,
recommending that Hongkong be ruled for a brief period by
an Anglo-Chinese administration, prior to its unconditional
return to China. In addition to the above arguments there
are many who believe that Great Britain should relinquish
Hongkong immediately, before Chinese resentment has piled
up to such an extent that it will be impossible to allay ill
feeling.
(2) Reform of the Japanese Government.
On January 1, 1944, the Generalissimo delivered a speech
in which he stated that the Japanese militarists must be "wiped
out" and the Japanese political system purged of all aggressive
elements. He added: "As to what form of government Japan
should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened
and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves." The
Generalissimo further referred to a possible revolution in
Japan, which would overthrow the militarist regime, in which
case, be said, we should respect the "spontaneous will" of the
Japanese people and "allow them to choose their own form of
government." Failing a revolution, however, other Chinese
have suggested that the United Nations should exert "irresistible external pressure" 7 to force the present Japanese Government out of power and strengthen the bands of the liberal
' S. R. Chow, op. cit., p. 21.
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elements. It is urged that one means of pursuing such a policy
would be to refuse to deal with the present Japanese administration or any other militarist faction in concluding the peace
settlement.
(3) Disarmament of Japan.
In regard to the disarmament of Japan, unofficial Chinese
proposals support the following measures:
(a) The United Nations should take over all Japanese aircraft, military and non-military, and Japan's air bases should
be demolished.
(b) Japan should be deprived of her navy, naval bases, and
shipbuilding yards for naval vessels.
(c) Japan should not be allowed to maintain a national
army.
(d) Armament factories should be confiscated; the import
of arms into Japan should be prohibited and the import of
strategic raw materials controlled.
(e) An International Commission, with agencies on the spot,
should ensure the enforcement of the disarmament clauses of
the treaty. It is argued by some Chinese that prolonged
supervision by such a Commission is essential; that Western
experts underestimate Japan's will and capacity for renewed
aggression; that the impracticability of prolonged control
has been unduly exaggerated.
( 4) Reparations.

Financial reparations, such as followed the last World War,
appear to be regarded as impractical in China. Reparation
demands center around two main proposals. (a) It is proposed that Japan should be made to surrender in favor of
China all her investments, properties and material assets
(whether state-owned or not) in all of China including Manchuria. This is obviously a vital question from the Chinese
point of view, as Manchuria is expected to play a key role
in the post-war industrialization of China. (b) The suggestion is made by Chinese-and by others as well-that a considerable part of Japan's machinery for heavy industry be
transported to China in order to help in the reconstruction of
China, in order to prevent Japan's rebuilding her armament
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industry, and as just retribution for the Japanese attack on
China.
In conclusion it may be said that the main differences of
opinion between Chinese and Americans in relation to the
proposed peace terms which have appeared to date seem to
relate to the amount of economic freedom to be given Japan.
This issue hinges in turn on the question of whether or not
liberal elements will control the Japanese government after
the war. Should this be the case, it is believed by many
thoughtful observers that the Chinese would alter their views
concerning such matters as the removal of Japan's industrial equipment to China. (For arguments against the destruction of Japanese industry, see "What Future for Japan?" by
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Foreign Policy Reports, September 1,
1943.)
2. What role should the United States play in China's postwar industrialization?
China is grimly determined to speed up the pace of her
industrialization after the war. Even for a country where
paper plans always flourish in abundance, China is today
producing an astonishing number of plans for postwar industrialization. Every government ministry is formulating programs; official and unofficial planning conferences have been
held; and the Generalissimo himself in his famous book
China's Destiny (issued in China last spring but not yet
released abroad) has set forth "masses of figures " to be
achieved both on a ten year schedule and in longer periods.
The objectives cover such matters as an increase in the output of iron, coal and steel; the production of machinery, locomotives, automobiles, steamships, etc.; the expansion of light
industries; and the further development of export commodities.

a. What stake has the United States in the post-war industrialization of China ?
It is argued that the aims of Chinese industrialization are
by no means of interest to China alone. Looking back over
modern history it is clear that China- with important
resources and a potential market of 400 million customers
-has been an inevitable cause of conflict among the Powers
for advantages, exploitation and conquest. Many feel that
there will be no end to this struggle until China is strong,
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strong enough to defend herself. Only a self-dependent and
vigorous China, it is said, can bring peace to the Far East.
A prerequisite of China's strength is economic power and
for this reason, if for no other, the United States should regard
China's industrialization as essential.
In addition, however, there are those who consider that the
industrialization of China may help the United States, Great
Britain and other nations in the solution of some of their own
economic problems. Post-war China, it is stated, should be
able to absorb idle American capital and furnish a market for
foreign goods. Sceptics point out that China has, for the
last hundred years, been regarded as the coming El Dorado
of the American trader, but that this dream has never approached realization. The answer given by some to this criticism is that the Chinese cannot buy consumers' goods in large
quantities while they remain a nation of poverty-stricken
peasants. In this connection, emphasis is placed on the benefits that should accrue from industrial progress. During the
period of China's industrialization, her import demands will be
primarily for capital goods, while over a longer period of
time, as the experience of the past has shown, the industrialization of China will mean greatly increased and varied foreign
trade, and will contribute considerably to the maintenance of
a prosperous world economy.
b. On what terms should the United States participate in
Chinese post-war industrialization?
In the years immediately after the war, some economists
believe, China may find it more difficult to obtain capital goods
than funds. The blockade, they point out, has made it impossible for China to make use of either the $500 million loan
granted by the United States in 1942, or the money. which is
accumulating through the remittances of overseas Chinese
and through foreign expenditures in China. When the war is
over, China will presumably have this money for immediate
use.
It is assumed, nevertheless, that in the long run China will
need funds, goods and technicians. The Chinese claim, however, that no matter how great the need, they will not accept
foreign assistance on the old terms. Loans were formerly guaranteed, for example by the customs revenues, and to ensure
the proper collection of these revenues foreigners were ·placed
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in charge of the Customs Administration. Foreign business
was conducted, to a large extent, within the sheltering walls of
Concessions, free from taxes and other forms of Chinese jurisdiction. Foreign advisers often acted, not as servants of the
Chinese Government, but in a partially independent capacity,
serving also the interests of foreign Powers. Conditions such
as these caused much resentment and were referred to as factors reducing China to a "semi-colonial status." Moreover,
it was felt that foreign business, enjoying special privileges,
was able to smother China's infant industries by unfair competition. The fact that much of China's industrial development was taking place under foreign control also led to the
feeling that policies were instituted in a haphazard fashion
which might result in profits for individual firm s but which
took little account of Chinese economy as a whole.
It is with this experience in mind that Chinese are insisting today that if foreign aid is offered only on the old terms,
they would prefer to raise capital within their own country.
No one underestimates the hardships this would entail, but
China, above all nations, has shown her capacity to endure
suffering. Besides privation, any such course would probably
mean retarding, to a serious extent, the pace of Chinese industrial development. Moreover it must be remembered that
experience has shown that economic isolation means rigid state
planning under authoritarian control.
(1) Loans.
If China requires further loans from the United States,
should they be made from government or private sources?
On the one hand, it is argued that private capital is less
politically "explosive" and would therefore be more acceptable
to the Chinese. On the other hand, grave doubts are expressed
as to whether private capital will be willing to take any such
risks without guarantees of security and high returns. The
loans floated in this country after the last World War, in relation to Europe and South America, are cited for their disastrous consequences and it is intimated that the American
public is not likely to want to repeat this experience. It is
suggested that government loans, whether made directly between Washington and Chungking or through some international agency acting as intermediary, will probably be used
extensively following World War H.
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Whether private or public loans are made, however, it will
be necessary to consider certain basic facts. There is nothing
to be gained and much to be lost, it is felt, by viewing conditions through rose-colored glasses. Chinese inflation has now
reached appalling proportions and both Chinese and Americans recognize that this situation must be remedied if foreign
capital is to find its way into China. Political stability is
another prerequisite of foreign loans. There is no use blinking the fact that lack of political unity has been a critical
problem in modern China. In the decade before the National
Government was established, China was torn by struggles
between warlords. Even after the advent of the Chiang
Kai-shek regime, conflicts between the central government
and local factions continued and a long and bitter war was
fought with the Communists. Whether these difficulties will
be resolved in the post-war era is a question which remains
to be decided.
There are other issues, hard to define in black-and-white,
but still of importance when considering post-war loans to
China. In Western terms, China is still a long way from being
modernized, especially as far as her industrial structure is
concerned. Moreover, modernization entails a long and difficult experience by means of which China must develop the
particular form of economy best suited to her needs. As Professor ]. B. Condliffe has stated : "China cannot be turned
overnight into a mechanically minded, industrial community.
It is too easy a solution to believe that economic development
can be achieved simply by transplanting some of the mechanical tricks and tools of the West. These tricks and tools are
the tangible results of a long and painful process of scientific
application. The fundamental principles of which they are
applications need to be applied in new ways to the different
problems of China."S
These conditions suggest a post-war period of trial-and-error
which may entail considerable confusion. Moreover, certain
administrative features must be taken into account. One of
these is "squeeze", which though commonly practiced both in
political administration and the conduct of business in China,
has proved a stumbling block in many phases of her national
life.
• J. B. Condliffe, " The I ndustrial Department of China" in NaticmaJ Reconstructio,.,
April , 1943.
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Reviewing all these considerations concerning the post-war
industrialization of China, it is suggested that the assumption be made that in the immediate post-war period, loans
granted to China will be on an inter-governmental basis. The
questions that derive from this are: How can these loans be
made without returning to the old pernicious practice of
infringing China's sovereignty? On what terms can loans be
negotiated that will safeguard United States' interests?
(2) Foreign enterprise in China.
While some of the above considerations apply to the carrying on of foreign business (industrial, financial and commercial) in China, some special problems are also present in this
connection. Americans will face a new situation in having
to conduct their business affairs without the benefit of extraterritorial privileges. Those who believe that this should
offer no difficulties point to the fact that Germans and Russians have, long since, ceased to enjoy extraterritorial rights;
that, in the hinterland, foreigners have depended little on
extraterritoriality; that some of the larger American and
British companies have incorporated under Chinese law in the
past.
On the other hand it is argued that, inherent in the new
situation, are many unknown factors that will determine the
future role of foreign enterprise in China. Possibly foremost
among these is the attitude-still undecided- that the Chinese
will adopt. There are those who are convinced that the need
for assistance will result in China's welcoming foreign enterprise. Counterbalancing this theory, however, is the fact
that the Chinese Government probably will want to maintain
control of heavy industry itself and to promote Chinese enterprise in light industry. Today there are indications of the
existence of both these trends. In September 1943, a resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang lifted the restriction
which limited the ratio of foreign capital in Sino-foreign enterprises to 49%; the same resolution also declared that all other
regulations governing ·such enterprise "shall be revised."
While this suggests that the Chinese will welcome foreign
business activity, a different tone has been adopted in proposals made by some Chinese economists. A list of these
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published in an article by C. W. Meng9 includes: (a) The
period of existence of foreign factories in China shall be
decided by the National Government. Upon the expiration
of the period, the _rational Government may take over the
factory with compensation, or may order the cessation of
operations within a limited period. (b) Exemption from taxes,
which may be specially permitted to Chinese factories as
encouragement to the development of domestic industries,
shall not be applicable to foreign factories. (c) All staff members and laborers of foreign factories in China shall be Chinese.
If it is necessary to employ foreign technicians, their employment shall be reported to the Chinese authorities for approval.
In view of the foregoing, there are, despite the many uncertainties involved, some basic questions which it is well to ask
at the present: What role can foreign enterprise play in postwar China that will be helpful and not harmful to Chinese
development? How can foreign enterprise conform to the
requirements and the interests of the Chinese people and still
further its own legitimate aims?
c. What form shall China's post-war industrialization take
and how is this 1·elated to United States interest and policy?
(1) Heavy vs. light industry?
Among the most discussed problems of post-war industrialization in China is the question of whether to emphasize
heavy or light industry. Many economists insist that the logical procedure would be to concentrate on light industry at the
outset. This, they recall, was the method followed by such
highly mechanized nations as Great Britain and the United
States. Moreover, they believe such a choice would be consistent with the present state of Chinese economy which is
based on small units of production. Also, they point out that
light industry requires less capital and that after China has
accumulated funds through the sale of consumers' goods, she
will be in a better position to afford the development of her
heavy industries.
Others disagree with this approach for several reasons. A
nation can achieve economic independence, even in relative
terms, they say, only through the establishment of basic industries. Moreover they are convinced that China can not afford
the luxury of concentrating on the production of consumers'
o Far Eastern Survt:y, Nov. S, 1948.
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goods, when at any moment she may need armaments. In
this connection, they assert that the form of Chinese industrialization will depend to a considerable extent on the type
of peace settlement that is made and how much security
China derives from it.
While the above arguments are heard frequently, it should
be remembered that there is still a third possibility, namely,
the development of both light and heavy industry at approximately parallel rates.
(2) Government vs. private control?
Closely linked with the debate concerning light and heavy
industry is the discussion concerning government and private
control. During the war, the government's hold has been
extending itself more and more over the entire system of
Chinese economy. The war seriously undermined the existence
of private modern banks, with the result that the government
has gained control of the banking system. Foreign trade is
under government direction and most of the heavy industries
are government owned.
Those who argue that this process of centralization should
continue after the war say that all strategic industries ought,
for defense reasons, to be state owned; that if the pace of
China's industrialization is to be accelerated, the government alone has the power to do so; that private capital will
not have the means either to establish or conduct many of the
essential enterprises.
On the opposite side, the argument is advanced that government control over the economic structure of a country means
placing the resources and the power in the hands of a small
group of people. While many object in general terms, there
are also those who object on the specific grounds that this is
what is taking place at the moment and that to continue the
present policy merely means strengthening the more conservative elements of the Chungking government. People
who hold this view are likely to maintain in addition that, in
developing a country, free enterprise usually stimulates production and provides a check on bureaucracy.
Which policy will gain the upper hand remains to be seen,
but here too it should be pointed out that government and
private enterprise may develop side by side. This is in fact
the tendency at the moment, with the government taking over
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heavy industries and allowing private capital, where it is
capable of doing so, to engage in light industries.
(3) What is the interest of the United States ?
The form that industrialization takes in China will inevitably affect her economic relations with the United States.
The amount and nature of the loans China will require, the
quantity and type of goods that she will buy and sell abroad,
the opportunities left open for foreign enterprise--questions
such as these will be determined to a large extent by decisions
made in respect to the development of heavy and light industries and the establishment of government and private control.
Moreover, the interrelationship between industrialization
and the improvement of agricultural conditions in China is
constantly being emphasized. Many point out that industrialization is not an isolated phase of the economic life of a
country but must be considered in relation to the whole. The
"China market", so long spoken of by Americans, can never
materialize while China's "400 million customers" have no
purchasing power with which to buy.
3. How should the United States shape her policies toward
post-war China in the political sphere ?

a. What problems are likely to arise concerning the policy
of dealing with China as a "great" Power? How should the
United States meet these?
At times during the war, the Chinese have felt that they
were receiving insufficient recognition from the United States
and Great Britain in the planning of United Nations' strategy.
This has been due to their lack of representation in certain
administrative boards and conferences, and also to the fact
that relatively little military assistance has been given China
to date and that a large proportion of the Allied emphasis has
been put on the war in the Atlantic at the expense-in the
Chinese view-of the Pacific area. The participation of China
in the Cairo Conference and the Moscow Declaration served,
however, to dissipate much ill-feeling. The extent to which
this participation has pleased the Chinese can be seen in a
statement made by the Chinese News Service shortly after
the Cairo meeting:
"China became one of the 'big four' that signed the Moscow
Declaration. Now at the Cairo Conference, China was ac-
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corded the position of one of the 'big three' in the Pacific
war. It is indeed a far cry from the China of unequal treaties,
the China of Settlements and Concessions, the China of fears
and anxieties, to the new and vigorous China of today, the
China that is taking a prominent position in the councils of
great Powers .... "
According to reports, the United States Government is
emphasizing the necessity of giving China a leading role
among the United Nations, on an equal footing with Great
Britain, Russia, and the United States. As far as the postwar period is concerned, it is evident that this policy will
be put to the test by having to meet many concrete problems.
The extent to which Chinese wishes will be respected in the
peace settlement is a case in point. If an international
organization is set up after the war, there will be many questions to decide such as the number of votes to be accorded
each of the member states and which nations should be represented on the various governing bodies. If an international
police force is created, it will be necessary to allocate responsibilities to all the participating countries. In looking ahead to
situations such as these, it is well to consider what the policy
of the United States ought to be.
b. What policy should the United States adopt toward political problems which may arise in post-war China such as
(1) political unity, ( 2) the strengthening of democracy?
The questions raised below concern the shape of American
policy in respect to certain specific domestic problems that
may arise in post-war China. This part of the Analysis might
well be considered, however, in relation to the more general
issues of (a) the means, if any, by which one government is
justified in influencing the internal conditions of another,
(b) the extent to which such influence may justifiably be carried. The key position which the United States, due to its
wealth and power, will inevitably occupy in the post-war
period make it essential to face these issues squarely.
( 1) Political unity.
It has been extremely difficult for modern China to maintain political unity. Even after the time of the warlords there
still remained, in the period 1928-37, many local leaders who
governed in their special areas on a virtually autonomous
basis. In addition, there have been national parties, one of
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which, the Kuomintang, bas ruled China since 1928 on a
one-party system. The strongest group opposing the Kuomintang has been the Communists. There were--and are--bowever, other parties which though far less well-known have
played a not unimportant role in China.
After the establishment of the National Government, Chiang
Kai-sbek waged a bitter war against the Communists for ten
years. Finally in 193 7, the Kuomintang and Communists
agreed to set aside their differences and join in a United Front
in order to withstand the Japanese invasion. Following this,
the Communists who live in the so-called Border Region in
the northwest, sent their troops (the famous Eighth Route
and New Fourth armies) to mobilize the population and conduct guerilla warfare behind and between the Japanese lines
in north and central China. In the areas which thus came
under their control, the Communists introduced more popular
governmental procedures and agrarian reforms.
The Central Government has objected to these Communist
activities on the ground that the Communists were trying to
"run their own show" by supporting an independent administration and military force and by pursuing their own policies.
The Communists, on the other hand, have accused Chungking
of maintaining a military blockade around the Border Region
and of using repressive measures which they feel makes it
impossible for them to relinquish their independence with
safety. One cost of the strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists has been the frequent recurrence of crises, carrying with them serious threats of civil war.
Civil war, it is evident, would affect not only China but all
the United Nations. For this reason, the United States bas,
indirectly, been drawn into the Kuomintang-Communist controversy. While nothing was definitely known in the past,
there were those who felt that the State Department, backed
by the power derived from the control of credits and LendLease assistance, was using its influence to avoid civil war in
China. Left-wing groups on the other band, charged that
officials in Washington were telling Chungking that it must
continue to fight the Communists if it wished to maintain its
friendship with the United States. This charge, made publicly by Earl Browder, moved Sumner Welles, then Under
Secretary of State, to make a significant statement of American policy which read in part:
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"With regard to the specific charge that 'the State Depart-,_
ment in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete
unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and
the Communists', what this statement alleges is the exact
opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington
has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete
unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof".l o
Mr. Welles concluded by saying that "this Government"
desires unity within China and within all countries of the
United Nations group not only for the sake of the conduct
of the war but also for the "creation and maintenance of conditions of just peace."
The importance of the Kuomintang-Communist controversy
to post-war America was stressed also in a broadcast made last
August by Raymond Gram Swing:
"While it is undeniable that this (i.e. the Kuomintang-Communist problem) is an internal affair of the Chinese, it is not
one that China's allies can ignore, while the war is in progress.
Nor will this country be able to ignore it after the war is
over. The Chinese people have all the sympathy of this
country, and deserve it. They will need American loans and
equipment after the war. Their place as a power and their
leadership for stability and development must be assured.
So long as the United States has Pacific responsibilities what
happens in China will affect us .... " 11
In discussing whether, if serious political friction persists
in China, United States' policy should continue to follow the
lines indicated in Mr. Welles' statement, it is well to remember
that the principle enunciated by Mr. Welles has been set
forth on a number of occasions by previous administrations
in Washington. The United States was, for example, the first
country to recognize the present National Government in
China and it did so precisely on the basis that the Chiang
Kai-shek regime, more than any other group, showed signs of
being able to establish and maintain political unity. Aside,
therefore, from the question of what our policy ought to be,
the support of "complete unity" is in keeping with American
to Text in Far Eastern Survey, August 1.1, 194cS.
u Text in Amerasia, September 1943.
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Far Eastern tradition and is the policy most likely to be maintained.
(2) The strengthening of democracy.
Sun Yat-sen stated that China should go through three
stages of evolution: the first to consist of pacification of the
country under military control; the second to serve as a period
of "political tutelage" to prepare the Chinese people for selfgovernment; the third to establish constitutionalism. Since
the end of the revolution in 1928, China has been living in the
stage of "political tutelage." Running parallel to the structure
of the government (which consists of such bodies as legislative, executive, judicial, examination and control yuans) is
the elaborate organization of the Kuomintang Party that extends all the way from powerful central committees at the top,
through provincial councils, to small local units. Moreover,
the func tions of the Government and the Kuomintang are
closely interwoven.
Since the early 1930's China has been moving gradually
toward the third or constitutional stage of its political development. A constitution was drafted and published in 1936 and
plans were made and set in motion for the calling of a constitutional assembly. The convening of the assembly, however, was interrupted by the Sino-Japanese War. Recently
the issue has come to the fore again with the announcement
by the Government that a congress will be held to adopt the
constitution within a year after the war.
This declaration of the Government's has been widely
acclaimed, both in China and in other countries, as a democratic step and an important move forward in the history of
China. Some criticisms are, however, levelled against certain
features of the draft constitution, such as the fact that the
legislature is to meet only every three years, and will consist
of over 2,000 members, regarded as an unwieldly number.
Also, there are many who consider that the organization and
membership of the constitutional assembly- which was determined in pre-war days-should be altered as they are said no
longer to represent political conditions in China.
In addition, there are those who, while welcoming the constitution, feel that the gains which can be made through
changes in the structure of any government are limited. Democracy, they say, is not a matter of decrees but has its roots
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deep in the conditions of the people. Until economic-and
especially agrarian- reforms are effected in China, they believe
that democracy cannot be truly vigorous.
The question remains as to what effect the war has had
on the democratic movement in China. Many think that
significant progress has been made, not only through the advance toward a constitution but also by means of such measures as the establishment of the People's Political Council,
which was created in 1938 and is the most popularly constituted of China's governing bodies. Others, however, feel that
the tendency during the war-ascribed partly to the fact
that China has been cut off from her more progressive and
modernized eastern areas-has lain in the direction of
strengthening the conservative groups in the country. An
indication of this, they declare, is to be found in the strict
controls imposed by the Government, especially within the
last years. Pearl Buck states, for example, that "the great
liberal forces of the recent past in China are growing
silent. . . . There is now no real freedom of the press in
China, no real freedom of speech."12
In another article,13 published in Asia and The Americas last
November, entitled Post-War China and the United States,
Pearl Buck sets forth the thesis that the course of democracy
in post-war China may depend to a large extent on the attitude of the United States. The winning of the war will in
itself, she says, strengthen democracy everywhere but this
is not enough; the freedom of peoples is not won by military
victories but "bit by bit in every nation." The essential
question, she believes, is whether the United States will "decide
for domination and empire" after the war or follow its " own
genius in friendly relations with all". Only in the latter case
she thinks will the people in Asia-and elsewhere-"breathe
more freely and move more slowly", thus making possible the
sound development of their own national life.

,. Life, llfay 10, 1948.
ts "Post· War China and the United States," Asia and the Americo.r1 November, 1943.
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RECAPITULATION OF QUESTIONS
1. What is China likely to want from the peace settlement

as regards treatment of Japan? To what extent should
the United States join with China in her demands as
regards
a. Territorial settlement
b. Reform of the Japanese Government
c. Disarmament of Japan
d. Reparations
2. What role should the United States play in China's postwar industrialization?
a. What stake has the United States in the post-war
industrialization of China?
b. On what terms should the United States participate in
Chinese post-war industrialization?
(1) Loans
( 2) Foreign enterprise in China
c. What form should China's post-war industrialization
take and how is this related to United States interest
and policy?
( 1) Heavy vs. light industry?
( 2) Government vs. private enterprise?
(3) What is the interest of the United States?
3. How should the United States shape her policies toward
China in the political sphere?
a. What problems are likely to arise in carrying out the
policy of dealing with China as a "great" Power?
How should the United States meet these problems?
b. What policy should the United States adopt toward the
problems which may confront post-war China in relation to ( 1) ·political unity ( 2) the strengthening of
democracy?
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